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Knocking down the system.
Populism in Paweł Kukiz’s political discourse∗
Abstract. Populism in the discourse of the Polish politician Paweł Kukiz
is manifested both on the content plane and in its linguistic expression. Kukiz’s
parliamentary speeches and Facebook posts contain all the features constitutive
of populism, such as the central position of the people (in contrast to the estab-
lishment of “the others”), a simplification of the linguistic worldview (including
values), and the figure of a leader representing the people. The language of
the discourse is colloquial, close to that of the average speaker, imbued with
emotions and expressive evaluations, using metaphors and stereotypes and
other means. This kind of communicative style helps the politician project an
image of himself that appears coherent with the roles he plays, by invoking
the archetypes of a warrior and “a regular guy”, but one that always enjoys
a dominant position.
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1. It is the citizen, not the government or political parties,
that should be at the heart of the state.
Populism and persuasion
Despite the fact that discourse, including political discourse, has long been
investigated by political scientists, media experts, and linguists, its remains
notoriously difficult to define in an unambiguous manner. In this article,
discourse is understood in the spirit Teun van Dijk’s model, discussed in detail
by Bartmiński and Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska (2009: 32–33).1 Following
the latter authors, we will be analysing discourse taking into account the
attitude of the speaker (sender), as well as the communicative relationship
between the speaker (sender) and hearer (receiver), which derives from the
speaker’s strategies in producing populist statements.
To deal with the problem of populism nowadays means facing, at the very
outset, two major difficulties: (1) the disputes on the essence of populism
between the researchers who view it as a form of ideology (Canovan 1981;
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Mudde 2007) and those who prefer to see
it as a particular thinking style (Karwat 1998: 99) or a variant of a political
strategy (Kazin 1995; Laclau 2005), and (2) the totally different everyday
understanding of this notion (with its strong evaluative load and semantic
fuzziness). Says Pierre-André Taguieff:
It is ironic that for the word populism to become popular has been an unlucky
development. Populism has broken free from scientific discourse and has flourished in the
polemical space controlled by politicians, journalists, and media intellectuals, in the form
of polemical phrases such as a “populist trend”, “populist aspirations”, “populist threats”,
etc. [. . . ] The term has been adopted as a negative category with dangerous connotations,
without having been subjected to critical analysis. (Taguieff 2010: 145)
In order to restore the explanatory utility of the notion, it is necessary to
reconstruct its vital elements, starting from the fundamental category of the
people, mentioned by all sides of the debate. In their attempt to identify the
essence of populism, Albertazzi and McDonnell distinguish four principles,
all directly related to “the people”: (1) the people are one and are inherently
“good”; (2) the people are sovereign; (3) the people’s culture and way of life
are of paramount value; and (4) the leader and the party/movement are one
with the people (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008: 6).
It is the reference to the various ways that the people – always positively
understood – (along with the declaration that one speaks for the people and
on their behalf) that determines the characteristic dichotomous structure of
1 Bartmiński and Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska mainly rely on van Dijk 2006.
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populism. This, in turn, gives rise to a simplified vision of the socio-political
reality, with its antagonism between the “people” and the “non-people”. As
Harald Bergsdorf has aptly put it, “[p]opulists aim to crush the Gordian knots
of modern politics with a sword of alleged simple solutions” (Bergsdorf 2000:
624; after Mudde 2004: 542). The framework of populism – founded on that
opposition – is filled with various (socially and culturally relativised) content
that embodies the linguistic worldview of a given speaking subject. Therefore,
particular examples of populism largely differ from one another in terms of
ideology (there is left-wing vs. right-wing populism), the elements of a po-
litical system they refer to (populist regimes, parties, movements, leaders),
origin (Latin American, European, Russian, American populism), and time
in history (19th-c. populism, contemporary populism) (Moroska 2010: 25).
Such a great variety of forms and mutations leads one to believe that
populism is not “a fixed constellation but a series of discursive resources
which can be put to very different uses” (Laclau 2005: 176). Indeed, populism
has a multi-faceted nature:2 it consists of a body of variously related content,
focused on the overarching idea of “the people”, selectively borrowed by the
discourse author and freely combined with new content or a new linguistic
form. In “populist hybrids”, formed in this way, the new elements (which si-
multaneously reflect the socio-political context and the populist’s linguistics
skills) are always subordinated to the concept of the people as the highest
value (Tokarczyk 1999: 541–558). In the case of populist discourse, a dis-
tinction between strictly populist components and complementary strands
woven into them is drawn by first identifying the constitutive elements of
populism and then indicating the points that link it (at the level of subject
matter) with politics (which is also multi-faceted by nature, but equipped
with a different repertoire of ideas)3 and (at the level of linguistic form) with
persuasion.
In this article, five elements are taken as constitutive of populist discourse:
(1) the people occupy the central position in the populist worldview (with
the properties mentioned above); (2) the people are always presented in
opposition to “non-people” (e.g. the privileged elite or strangers); (3) the
linguistic worldview of the society is simplified; (4) there is a leader who
performs the role of the (genuine or self-proclaimed) vox populi ; (5) the
message is intelligible enough to be communicated directly to as many
2 Being multi-faceted is a nonspecific property, ascribed also to other social phenomena.
Its essential significance is that it implies a unique kind of “connectivity”, analogous to
the connectivity of words, through which its constitutive elements involve complementary
components interwoven into them.
3 Karwat 2009.
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recipients as possible.4 These components are necessary features; however,
their prevalence in the analysed variant of discourse varies depending both
on the linguistic devices used by the specific speaker, and on extralinguistic
factors, including the political situation (especially the specific character
of contemporary liberal democracy) (Meny and Surel 2002), the individual
way the speaker interprets the category of the people (which determines
his/her broader social worldview), and the way the speaker puts into practice
their individual vision of the political “people’s voice” (self-creation through
an archetype). It should be emphasised, however, that in categorising social
personas, populism does not appeal to the classical, horizontal political
division into left-wingers and right-wingers, but introduces its own, new,
vertical division that excludes, from the category of the glorified and virtuous
people, both the elites (from the top of the social hierarchy) and “others”
or “strangers”, however defined (from its bottom) (Moroska 2010: 26; Meny
and Surel 2002).
As far as the linguistic plane is concerned, the populist picture of the
social world is often drawn with persuasive devices, although the connection
between populism and persuasion is more of a statistical correlation than
a substantive relationship. One cannot, after all, rule out the existence of
persuasion-free populism: for instance, when the speaker is a sincere follower
of populist ideology, his/her dominant need to “serve the people” would over-
shadow the will to effectively “persuade the people”. Persuasion is broadly
used by populists, as an effective linguistic strategy designed to “exert real in-
fluence on the recipient’s thinking or behaviour – not by direct command, but
by sending a hidden, indirect message, so that the dominant function of the
discourse appears to be other than connotative” (Barańczak 1983: 31). How-
ever, persuasion is not unique to this type of discourse. Signals of persuasion
in populist discourse (or any other discourse) include the following character-
istic rhetorical mechanisms: (1) emotionalisation of reception; (2) creation of
a world community of people and a community of language; (3) simplification
of the distribution of values; and (4) alternative-free reception (Barańczak
1983: 33–35). The strength of the link between these linguistic devices and
populism can be judged when persuasion, understood as relieving the recip-
4 Ożóg also mentions other linguistic features of the populist discourse: prominence
given to a specific axiological system, emotional slant of the texts, use of irony and
rhetorical questions, arbitrary assignment of meanings, and colloquial style (Ożóg 2006:
206–216; cf. also 2005: 325–334). Some of these elements fall into the categories identified
here; for example, the axiological system, colloquial style, and emotionality are components
of the linguistic worldview, which we understand in accordance with the assumptions of
cultural linguistics.
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ient of the obligation to engage in independent intellectual activity, is con-
fronted with a description of the “leader of the people” – a demagogue who is
a rather slovenly sophist student, but [who] does not have to make too much of an effort,
because he/she does not address the kind of people they would have to confound with
perverse logic. Instead they address those who prefer to feel rather than think, believe rather
than know and test, and make decisions that are suggested to them. (Karwat 2006: 16).
2. Knocking down the system. Paweł Kukiz’s populism
In this article, we analyse transcripts of the parliamentary speeches and
Facebook posts of the Polish politician Paweł Kukiz from between August
2015 and September 2016. The study covers the politician’s own posts and
excludes other users’ posts he had shared on his Facebook profile. The
content analysis was focused on the linguistic features that contributed to
the creation of the populist image of the politician. These features are related
to the specific ways in which statements characteristic of populist discourse
are shaped.
As already mentioned, by far the most important identifying feature of
populist discourse is the peculiar use of the category of the people. In
Paweł Kukiz’s discourse, the lexeme lud ‘the people’ appears only once in
his parliamentary speech of November 18, 2015, in which he portrays the
people as a sovereign in a democratic state:
I had really hoped that this would be a government of great change, that this would
be a government that would seek to empower the citizen, give the citizen control over
the authorities, that this would be a government that would speak loudly about the need
to change the electoral system to a majoritarian model, a government that would stay
in touch – and the Prime Minister has mentioned the necessity of such direct contact –
with citizens. This is what is really needed. But at that moment I expected them [the
government] to go further, to speak about the referendum, about strengthening the role
of this basic practice of democracy – of making contact with the people [lud ]. (Sejm,5
Session no. 1, 18 Nov 2015)
The infrequent use of lud is probably also associated with its negative
connotations that go back to the communist era (cf. WSJP online, entry:
lud). Another lexical item that appears in the same context as lud is obywatel
‘citizen’ (often used in plural), as well as adjectives derived from it that allow
the speaker to describe various elements of reality as obywatelskie ‘civic’. The
use of the word obywatel, defined as ‘a member of the state who has specific
5 The Sejm is the lower house of the Polish Parliament; its upper house is the Senat
(Senate). [editor’s note]
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rights and obligations stipulated in the constitution’ (SJP Szym 1988, vol. 2:
435), allows Kukiz to accentuate not only the existence of a particular social
group, but above all its relationship with the Polish state and the rights
granted by the constitution to every human being.6 Furthermore, by using
the noun obywatel, the politician chooses a form which, in contrast to the
collective noun lud, allows him to treat his recipients individually and thus
recognise their status as individual subjects. It is also worth noting that
in Kukiz’s Facebook posts and commentaries, the lexeme obywatel and its
derivatives are often spelled with a capital letter. The politician seems to be
doing more than just applying the spelling rule associated with the use of
honorifics, since both the noun obywatel and its derivatives are capitalised
not only when they are used to address the recipients, but also when they
are used in informational and promotional material, descriptions of projects
and bills prepared by Kukiz himself or his movement (Kukiz’15 ):
It was not my intention to speak against decent Citizens. (FB, 22 Dec 2015)
First of all, I was one of the people who informed the Citizens via the Internet,
a couple of years ago, that a bill was being drafted on the assistance of foreign services.
(FB, 6 Jan 2015)
Consolidated by the idea of a Civic state, mutual respect, friendship and work. (FB,
9 Jan 2015)
Look what power Citizens have when they speak in unison! (FB, 21 Jul 2016)
The fact that the category of citizen is marked in this way in many
utterances is not the only signal marking its “extraordinary” usage in political
discourse. Importantly, the citizen, citizenship and civic rights are treated as
prime values to which, as Kukiz declares, the actions of both the electoral
committee of Kukiz’15 and the movement’s leader are subservient. In many of
his statements, the politician says explicitly that the purpose of his political
activity is to serve citizens:
It is the citizen, not the government and political parties, that should be at the heart
of the state. [. . . ] Our true and only coalition partner is the Republic of Poland and its
citizens. (Sejm, Session no. 1, 18 Nov 2015)
Both Kukiz’s parliamentary speeches and Facebook comments feature
a kind of paradox. On the one hand, the politician comes across as someone
who is working for the citizens, having been elected to fulfil the tasks
entrusted to him, while on the other hand, he fits perfectly the role of the
6 The dictionary defines lud ‘the people’ as “individuals living in the same area, having
a common culture and language, who, however, have no national awareness or tradition
of political statehood” (accessed Sep 15, 2016).
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leader, a know-it-better disputant, who possesses knowledge and uses it.
His Facebook discussions often show that he sets himself up in the role of
the one who knows and is right, who knows and reveals the secrets of the
government, who breaks down the walls concealing those secrets, especially
those that negatively affect the situation of Polish citizens:
[in reply to the journalist Tomasz Lis, who had teased Kukiz about the fact that he
had allegedly been promised the position of Director of TVP 2 (Polish Public Television
Channel 2) but was not in the end appointed] You have a bad source of information,
Mr. Tomasz.7 We have fought for pluralism and a place in the Polish Television for
you.8 Unfortunately, it is Gucwiński who holds the copyright to With a Camera Among
Animals.9 (FB, 15 Jan 2016)
During the election campaign, Paweł Kukiz appealed in his public state-
ments to the archetype10 of the Rebel – an uncompromising dissident whose
goal is to fight against the existing norms and values, and whose greatest
opponent is the current system (Pearson and Mark 2001):
For the first time, we have a chance to bring Poland back to its citizens, to restore
a real democracy in which the citizen is the politician’s employer and not a serf of the
neo-aristocracy of party members. (FB, 13 Aug 2015)
I wish to thank the TRUE Warriors who want to take it all. [. . . ] For their defiance,
consistency, courage. [. . . ] Remember: we’ve already won. We have a clear conscience and
we will go down in history as heroes.11 (FB, 6 Sep 2015)
It is difficult to state for sure whether the utterance was “embedded” in
an archetypal context deliberately as a marketing strategy or whether the
word for warrior was used intuitively; nevertheless, it seems appropriate to
invoke the notion of archetypes for three reasons. First of all, the allusion to
7 A honorific that implies familiarity.
8 Lis used to be TVP’s star news presenter in the 1990s.
9 A popular TV series about animals at the Wrocław Zoo, broadcast in the years
1971–2002.
10 The typology of archetypes used in contemporary political discourse is not the classic
Jungian typology with the archetypal figures of the Shadow, the Anima, the Animus,
the Great Mother, the Old Wise Man, and the Self (Jung 1938), but a variant thereof
modified for use in commercial marketing and later adapted for the purpose of political
communication. This typology uses only positive role models, which are classified by
reference to one of the recipient’s four needs. It distinguishes archetypes whose appearance
in discourse is to satisfy the need for security: Ruler, Caregiver and Creator; the need for
achievement: Hero, Outlaw, and Magician; the need for happiness: Innocent, Explorer,
Sage; and the need for acceptance and the sense of belonging: Regular Guy/Girl, Jester,
Lover (Pearson and Mark 2001).
11 In the Polish original, the word WoJOWnicy ‘warriors’ has the acronym JOW
embedded in it, which stands for ‘single member constituencies’, a “winner-take-all’ model
of voting, for which Kukiz had famously campaigned during his bid for a parliamentary seat.
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the archetype of the Rebel is a continuation of Paweł Kukiz’s scenic image
of a socially engaged rock musician; secondly, it gives prominence to the
speaker’s antagonistic attitude to the status quo and his desire to change
the political situation;12 and thirdly, the archetype of the Rebel stimulates
change, making the narrative more lively, while at the same time it accounts
for the change within the archetype itself.13 These qualities of the archetype
of the Rebel have made it easy for the politician, after his electoral success,
to smoothly transform this role model by “embedding” his discourse in the
archetype of the Regular guy, a character who (in its “pure” variant) focuses
on aspects of everyday life, whose goal is to derive satisfaction from living in
a community, and who strives for acceptance from that community. Donning
the garb of the Regular guy, Paweł Kukiz the MP presents himself as an
“ordinary” member of the community of citizens, who uses their language (as
discussed below) and who knows and shares their daily toils and troubles.
He acts (an attribute of the Rebel) to overcome these problems and threats
(an attribute of the Caregiver), despite the obstacles thrown in his way by
the institution he works in.
The transition from one archetypal character to another in Kukiz’s
Facebook comments does not make him lose his credibility because the basic
content of the messages does not change – even though the emphasis in
variable: the pre-election Rebel, out of concern for the people, becomes the
leader of his “squad” to expose and combat the iniquities of public institutions,
in particular of political parties and of the party system (a holistic perspective,
top-down demarcation). At the same time, the Regular guy (the boy next
door) is no longer so strongly focused on contesting the political order which
he, after all, is a part of, but rather concentrates on hunting down the threats
that endanger the average citizen, such as callous civil servants, corrupt
lawyers, refugees who threaten Polish interests, the Germans, the hypocrisy
of the public media, etc. (this is an individualistic perspective, bottom-up
demarcation).
12 Laclau (2005) or Canovan (1981, 2005) also treat these properties as constitutive
elements of populism: “Populism is designed to mobilize ordinary people as a political
force against the established structure of power and dominant ideas of the society and
values with the intention of devaluing the latter as the basis of political legitimacy, and
replacing them with the common sense of the ordinary people” (Canovan 2005: 70).
13 This practice confirms the idea that “[e]ach story gradually loses its potential if it
ceases to surprise. Today’s audience look for non-stock identities, and to get or keep them
interested, one is allowed to break conventions by adding a twist to the story. That is
why more and more importance is being attached to narrative devices that divest the
characters of their perfection: a character should not be identical all the time, and ideally,
he/she should, to some extent, act against the rules. This is what the rebel type embodies”
(Wasilewski, Brach, and Bartnik 2011: 228).
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The category of the people understood as citizens is closely correlated
with the worldview based on the US–THEM opposition. The positively
appraised WE encompasses the Polish citizens, including Paweł Kukiz himself
and his electoral committee (i.e. people who represent the same mode of
thinking). The negatively appraised THEY, on the other hand, along with
the “strangeness” or “otherness” of their political views, includes the ruling
parties and the individuals responsible for political decisions in the country.
This means that the antinomy of the familiar and the strange features
very prominently in the analysed discourse, providing a framework for the
creation of a simplified, dichotomous world.
The positive side of this antinomy is constructed by means of inclusive
verb forms, which the interlocutor uses in order to locate himself among
his audience, the citizens he addresses. This is an easily recognised and
frequently used persuasive device that allows the speaker to build a world
that he or she shares with their audience. But Kukiz does not stop here. He
frames his statements in a such a way that every average citizen can regard
the leader of Kukiz’15 not only as their spokesman but in fact as someone
who speaks their colloquial language – the characteristic features of Kukiz’s
style are discussed below. At this point, however, it is worth paying attention
to the distinctive way in which the politician refers to the various figures on
the political scene: apart from using official first name-plus-surname forms,
he often uses a diminutive of the first name, that name alone, or a distorted
form of the surname. This manner of speaking adds to Kukiz’s discourse
certain emotional features typical of exchanges between people of equal
social status. This practice of colloquialisation is bidirectional: the voters
who communicate with Paweł Kukiz either address him familiarly, using the
pronoun ty ‘you-infml.’ and calling him by his name, or else use a colloquial
address form Panie Pawle,14 in which the first name Paweł is prefixed by
the honorific Pan ‘Mr.’.
Well, well! And here we have a solution to the authoritarianism of the Law and
Justice party! It is enough to simply move to Thailand, where (and I quote Przemek15)
14 Łaziński (2006) treats this formula as a universal polite form, which is used in
direct interactions as an unmarked honorific. This stands in contrast to Marcjanik (2006),
who finds such formulas clumsy and points out that “according to the Polish custom,
a person’s first name, even when prefixed by Pan/Pani ‘Mr./Mrs.(Ms.)’ points to an
unofficial relationship between the interlocutors. Pani Ewo ‘Ms. Ewa’ is, so to speak,
halfway between Proszę Pani ‘Madam’ and the simple Ewa [. . . ] If the addressee does not
accept the rules of the language game imposed on them, they will feel that the speaker is
being overfamiliar, and fraternisation is treated by the Polish custom as inappropriate
behaviour” (Marcjanik 2006: 231).
15 A diminutive of Przemysław, with reference to Przemysław Saleta, a Polish kick-boxer.
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the weather is nice, the food is tasty, and where you are surrounded by smiling people.
The thought of such a dream refuge, where one could wait for the rule of Law and Justice
to end is probably tempting for many Poles. [. . . ]
Przemek. . . An excellent idea! But tell me this – who will defend democracy in Poland
when you, Kraśko, Lis, Petru, Rycho, Zdzicho, Bronek,16 and other Boleks17 have left
us – reactionaries – in this cold country with terrible weather and dramatically bad food?
(FB, 7 Jan 2016)
I wonder if Donald [Tusk]’s grandfather took the same position towards Germany’s
“good faith” when it demanded a “corridor” to East Prussia. (FB, 20 Jan 2016)
The first line of division between the citizen (and the speaker) and the
stranger is manifested in the way political parties are portrayed, as well as in
the negative evaluation of the current party system. Kukiz refers to this sys-
tem with the negatively charged noun partiokracja ‘particracy’ (a neologism
coined by Józef Piłsudski18), derived from partia ‘party’ and demokracja
‘democracy’, to emphasise the contrast between the two concepts. Particracy
is thus a system (another key word in Kukiz’s idiolect) of government in
which the political process is dominated by political parties rather than
citizens. Since, in Kukiz’s view, Poland follows a particratic model of govern-
ment, to which he refers with the clearly negatively valuated noun system,
the politician often describes his own attitude, as well as that of his followers,
with the attribute antypartyjny ‘anti-party’.19 The opposition between the
concepts discussed here is clear in one of Kukiz’s Facebook posts: “One thing
is certain: citizenship is awakening, and the days of particracy in Poland are
numbered” (FB, 11 Jan 2016).
On the other hand, the lexeme system itself, in the sense of particracy,
appears in many statements, usually in a tone of accusation, a hope for the
16 Surnames of familiarised first names of journalists and politicians. [editor’s note]
17 Bolek was an alleged pseudonym of Lech Wałęsa in the files of the Communist secret
service. [editor’s note]
18 The First Marshal and leader (1920–1935) of the Second Polish Republic.
19 In political science, the concept of a political system is, of course, used as an
axiologically neutral analytical category; it is defined as a complex set of five political
elements: (1) all institutions (public authorities) that make up the structure of the state;
(2) non-state elements of the system, such as political parties, local government, pressure
and interest groups, non-governmental social organizations (as long as their activity is
politicised); (3) political values, principles, and norms; (4) the actions of political subjects;
and (5) the mechanisms relating these elements to one another (Maj and Paruch 2008:
71–72). In other words, it is a category with a broad but precisely defined content. In
Paweł Kukiz’s statements, the term functions as a label (similarly to the word układ
‘establishment, behind-the-scenes scheme’, previously used by the Law and Justice party);
its content is imprecise and variable (usually it covers institutions; on other occasions,
political parties, and on yet other occasions, procedures and mechanisms for action). See
also the concept of “occasional evaluative labels” in Polkowska (2015: 67–68).
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better (conditional on the abolition of the current system), or an explicit
election promise:
[To Lech Wałęsa] Twenty six years too late, Mr. President. The failure to de-communise
and the “thick line”20 led to the “dirt-digging” system in Poland. To a system based on
blackmail, on the absolute power of those who were the holders of [Security Service] files.
[. . . ] It is thanks to you, Mazowiecki, and other Michniks,21 that we have a particracy
and families at variance in Poland today. Twenty six years too late, Mr. Many Names.
(FB, 11 Jan 2016)
[In a commentary] I’ll be happy to leave [this gutter]. But only when this System has
been routed. Precisely because I’m a musician. (FB, 22 May 2016)
I keep my fingers crossed for Iceland. They broke the mould and swept away the
system at home; let them fight and win on the pitch. Let them show that it can be done,
that all you need is perseverance, work, and faith. That the hierarchy is not established
once and for all. (FB, 27 Jun 2016)
Divided, we will be swept away by the system. United, we will sweep the System
away. (25 Apr 2016)
. . . we have promised the citizens to return the state to them, we have promised to
remove party influence from state institutions. (Sejm, Session No. 11, 11 Feb 2016)
In Kukiz’s Sejm speeches, the concept of particracy appears only occa-
sionally, although it also has a negative valuation there. Used as an attribute
of the noun propaganda, it intensifies the negative evaluation of the party to
which the statement refers:
It was very important to us that the television should indeed be public, that it should
not be the same as in the times of Civic Platform,22 so that it should not be a tool of
particratic propaganda. (Session No. 17, 29 Apr 2016)
Importantly, in Kukiz’s political discourse, particracy is a broad con-
cept that encompasses not only the malfunctioning party system and the
frequently criticized electoral law, but also the previous ruling parties, the
various policy-makers, and even more broadly – the entire institutional
structure of the state. The most common grudge voiced by the MP in his
speeches and comments is that citizens are being robbed and cheated:
In our country, every government will, to a greater or lesser extent, rob the Citizens.
Until the moment comes when we will have changed our mentality of the serf. (FB, 24
Jun 2016)
20 Allusion to an expression used by a former Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
interpreted (rather mistakenly) as a sign of leniency towards former Communists. [editor’s
note]
21 Adam Michnik, Ed.-in-chief of the daily Gazeta Wyborcza, former opposition activist.
[editor’s note]
22 Platforma Obywatelska, a Polish political party, in power 2007–2015.
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The enemy, i.e. particracy or the system, is evoked by using unequivocally
negative labels, such as partyjniak ‘party official’, gang ‘gang’, bandyta ‘thug’,
klan ‘clan’, zbrodniarz ‘criminal’, aparatczyk ‘apparatchik’, or targowiczanin
‘member of the Targowica Confederation’, a synonym of ‘traitor’,23 etc. These
labels refer to specific social groups or political contexts; they are evaluative
and of varying intensity. Moreover, many contain historical allusions, which
serves to bind the community of its users. Consider further:
In all those situations where particracy is in danger, where the interests of the party
people are weakened, these two gangs merge into one POPiS24 and go hand in hand to
protect their positions established at the round stool. . . 25 (FB, 1 Jun 2016)
Read the article by the late Professor Jerzy Przystawa, an avid advocate of single-
member constituencies. If this electoral system was in force in Poland today, we would not
have any disputes about the Constitutional Tribunal, the dramatic division of the Nation,
and the thuggish all-powerful sovereignty of party clans over Citizens. (FB, 4 Jun 2016)
A referendum is a matter of regaining freedom and coming out from under the boot
of the Magdalenka26 criminals. (FB, 17 Aug 2016)
The metaphor of theft is a frequent one; it contains lexical elements
derived not only from colloquial Polish (łupić ‘rob’), but also from prison
slang, e.g. jumak ‘thief’, as in the following quote: “I’ve seen up close what
these thieves [jumaki ] are up to. This was the main reason why I entered
politics – to remove the thieves [jumaki ] from power” (FB, 15 Jun 2016).
As mentioned above, the vertical division characteristic of populism
is seen as a dividing line that separates the people not only from the
establishment or elites, but also from those in the bottom rungs. In Kukiz’s
online comments, one social group that stands in prominent opposition to the
people are refugees, depicted as enemies threatening Poland and the Poles.
This opposition is often represented by a graphic sign, a kind of logo that has
appeared several times on the politician’s social networking account, which is
a stop sign with an inscription: to refugees. The explicitly negative valuation
of refugees as enemies and strangers calls into question the stereotype of
the hospitable Pole, who is open and welcoming to foreigners. Paweł Kukiz
23 A 1792 confederation of Polish and Lithuanian magnates, supported by Catherine II,
the then Russian Empress. Its aim was to oppose the newly drafted Polish constitution of
1791. [editor’s note]
24 A commonly used acronym for the allegedly joint endeavours of two political parties:
PO (Civic Platform) and PiS (Law and Justice). [editor’s note]
25 An allusion to the Round Table talks of 1989, between the then Communist authorities
and the opposition. [editor’s note]
26 A conference centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where talks were held in late
1980s between the Communist authorities and representatives of the Solidarity Trade
Union. [editor’s note]
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does not try to hide this. On the contrary, he brings it into the limelight
by referring to refugees as “guests”, putting the word in inverted commas,
or preceding it with “so-called”: this is ironic and changes the valuation
from positive to negative. The aversion is highlighted and the negative
emotions are aroused by using the metaphor of home – the refugee is an
unwelcome guest in the Polish home, the home of all Poles: “It is unacceptable
that politicians should invite ‘guests’ to our home without asking Citizens
for their opinion” (FB, 6 Jan 2016). The escalation of negative emotions
and valuations is expressed through vulgar language and ironic comments
directed at people who hold a different view on this matter. The explicit
apologies Kukiz makes for his boorish, politically incorrect remarks turn
into an ironic commentary that ridicules and discredits the opinions of those
being apologised to, who are compared to astronauts, too far away from the
earth to see what is really going on:
Apparently, on Friday, the Americans shot this motherfucking savage. . . 27 Thank
God. . .
And, right away, I would like to apologise to Ms. Lubnauer, Ms. Pihowicz, Mr. Petru,
the entire Nowoczesna,28 and the HateStop Lady (I do not remember her name, so double
apologies) for calling the co-religionist of the “refugees” a “motherfucking savage”. I also
apologize to Mr. Kijowski. And, generally, the entire KOD29 and the Civic Platform. I also
apologise to Angela Merkel, comrade Kwaśniewski,30 and gays. I apologize to lesbians,
too. And astronauts. (FB, 25 March 2016)
Kukiz, in building the opposition between the familiar and the strange,
actualised in his discourse primarily in the form of the citizens-vs.-parties
antinomy, creates a narrative founded on a potential conflict between these
actors. However, the component that determines the narrative’s dynamics,
its coherence and credibility is not so much the antagonism itself, but, above
all, the model of the protagonist that appears in the narrative (Nowak 2010:
213). This kind of protagonist uses the rhetoric of domination, visible not
only on the content plane but also in linguistic forms that break moral
taboos (Wasilewski 2009: 331). The populist, casting himself in the role
of the “voice of the people”, uses well-entrenched archetypes which allow
the audience to quickly identify the features that the speaker attributes to
himself, the goals he sets, and the enemies he finds standing in his way.
The ease with which the recipients are supposed to identify the role
of the leader of the Kukiz’15 movement, who also expresses their own
27 Abdel Rahman al-Kaduli, a prominent member of ISIS.
28 An opposition party. [editor’s note]
29 Komitet Obrony Demokracji (Committee for the Defence of Democracy). Mateusz
Kijowski is the Committee’s founder. [editor’s note]
30 Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a former President of Poland. [editor’s note]
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judgements, leads to the emergence of an axiological worldview, in which
the most important values are the frequently evoked flagship concepts of
God, Honour, and Fatherland.31 In Kukiz’s statements, this axiological triad
is presented as timeless. These values can be called absolute or transcendent
(Puzynina 1992: 39): they allow the language-user to categorise reality in
a bipolar manner by dividing its elements into positive instrumental values,
which serve to preserve the absolute values, and negative values, which pose
a threat to the summum bonum, the highest good.
In the case of Paweł Kukiz’s discourse, the polarity of the axiological
hierarchy, characteristic of persuasive texts, is distorted. The politician
creates a vision of absolute, ultimate values, which give meaning to and
explain all political activities – the axiological world is thus maximally
simplified. The addressees, on the other hand, are not so much excused from
making a choice between the alternatives they have been given: they are
deprived of the opportunity of seeing the negative side of the axiological
opposition. There is only one right and correct set of values, a simplification
that frees the politician, clad in the archetypical roles of the Rebel, Warrior,
or the Regular Guy, from the task of convincing his audience to choose the
sacrum he professes. Instead, Kukiz emphasizes and names those (negative)
values that pose a direct threat to the axiological triad of God, Honour,
and Fatherland. Persuasion has been replaced here with typically populist
instruments: Kukiz, convinced of the rightness of his worldview, treats the
people (in this case citizens) as co-believers in the same values. However,
he directs the sharp barb of exclusion not only against the threats that are
lurking to harm citizens, but also the threats to the highest community-
uniting values.
It should be noted that Kukiz never defines the ultimate values: they
are only implied and intuitively understood, albeit in association with
contextualised statements that make direct reference to Christian values.
The latter are evoked through frequent exclamations, such as God forbid or
Thank God, as well as through the use of set phrases of biblical provenance,
which allow the speaker to discredit a political opponent, as in a FB post
containing a reference to “pieces of silver”:
And I must admit that I had great satisfaction blowing up (by pressing the green
button) all those media apparatchiks for whom God, Honour, and Fatherland are symbols
of reactionism and fascism. All those who served the political jet set for pieces of silver.
Tons of silver coins. (FB, 3 Jan 2016)
31 According to Michael Fleischer (2003: 116–118), they belong to the group of concepts
constitutive of Polish collective symbolism.
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Rzepliński,32 like Wałęsa, is in love with himself. If he was an honourable man, he
would resign. (FB, 18 Mar 2016)
The concept of honour, the second one in the triad, is understood as self-
respect (SJP Szym 1988, vol. 1: 753) and embraces the notion of citizen(s),
a superordinate category in the populist discourse. For Kukiz, the two notions
seem to be synonymous. A true citizen is someone who is guided by both
Christian and patriotic values, who is ready to fight for them, as well as for
his/her own dignity and honour. The last element of the triad, Fatherland,
is a concept that encompasses such values as ‘Poland’, ‘our home’, ‘the
state’, ‘Polish culture and traditions’, ‘history’, and ‘Polish identity’. The
symbolic nature of this axiological triad allows the politician to portray
specific persons or institutions as a threat to absolute values. What he does
most often, however, is mount his argumentation against what he considers
threats to a certain value. For example, refugees are presented as a threat to
Christianity (God), Polish tradition (Fatherland), or the individual citizen’s
freedom and dignity.
This portrayal of values also evokes stereotypical images of the Pole as
a Catholic and a patriot faithful to his fatherland: the stereotypes thus aspire
to the status of the axiological canon. The hierarchy of values is simplified:
as a result, Kukiz’s message is unambiguous and makes greater impact on
the receiver.
3. I do not intend to use the “language of the salons”. It’s an
alien way of speaking for me today. Paweł Kukiz’s idiolect
Kukiz’s axiological worldview, as it transpires through his speeches and
FB posts, is shaped by both the content and the form of his statements. The
language the politician uses is characterised by an emotional and colloquial
style, as well as a measure of vulgarity. It is a continuation of the way he
used to express his opinions as a politically engaged stage performer. His
mode of speaking in both types of texts analysed here is similar, although his
parliamentary speeches contain fewer vulgar elements. However, his speeches
in the Sejm are far less numerous than the number of FB posts (the latter
appearing nearly every day, often several times a day).
As the title of this section suggests (from FB, 20 Jan, 2016), the speaker
regards the official variety of Polish as alien. With several potential reasons
32 Andrzej Rzepliński, president of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in the years
2010–2016. [editor’s note]
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for the this, it seems that emotional, often vulgar colloquial language, with
elements of prison slang, allows Kukiz to exert greater influence on the
emotions of his audience. Moreover, the choice of a style that “does not fit
the salons” allows for greater bluntness of expression. With frequent use of
colloquial metaphors – including the metaphors of fight, theft, or swindling –
as well as biblical phrases, the speaker can vividly project his worldview,
with its clear good-vs.-evil dichotomy.
Obscenities, insults, and evaluative labels in Kukiz’s parlance are often
used in reference to “others” or “strangers” as a demonstration of power, the
power to breach the ethical taboo of avoiding abusive language in official
situations. In this way, the politician puts himself in a superior position not
only in the eyes of fellow politicians, but also of future voters.33
In demonstrating his power and reinforcing his political position through
language, Kukiz plays a peculiar game with language norms. A singer and
musician whose song lyrics abound in witty and attention-grabbing plays on
words, Kukiz brings his linguistic creativity into political discourse. Several
such devices can be mentioned. One of them was used in the debate on the
government programme 500+ (a family income-supporting benefit). The
template in the programme’s name, “something offered by the state” with
the “+” sign, was transformed by substituting its first element. The names
coined by Kukiz and members of the Kukiz’15 movement were: Koryto+
‘Trough+, Korytko+ ‘Little Trough+’, Reaktywacja+ ‘Reactivation+’ or
Cela+ ‘Prison Cell+’: they do not stand for the government’s offers to the
citizens but, instead, expose the manoeuvres of the ruling elite aimed to
improve their own situation at the expense of citizens. The “+” sign is being
discredited in that it no longer connotes positive values. An exception here
is the programme referred to as Cell+, whose aim is to clear the Polish
political scene of criminals who have deceived or robbed Polish people:
When a project of mass pay rises for top state officials, MPs, and senators appeared
in July, we started the “Trough+” action and managed to curb the aspirations of “the
Nation’s chosen ones”. But only for a moment. A month later, in August, the “Trough+”
programme, a salary increase scheme for the officials of the Chancellery of the Prime
Minister, was introduced through the back door. A substantial increase. By 100%. Now,
we have a continuation of this soap opera – today, episode three: “Trough+. Reactivation”.
A bill has been submitted to the Chancellery of the Sejm, providing for an increase of
funds to cover the costs of running MP offices. (FB, 23 Aug 2016)
33 According to Jacek Wasilewski, communicative behaviour which violates the principles
of etiquette is a rhetoric of dominance, in which the speaker wins advantage over their
interlocutor through the use of insults and profanities. This is a symbolic act of violence
(Wasilewski 2009: 331, 345–346).
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Well, good. We have the “Apartment+” and “500+” programmes. . . It’s time for
a “Prison cell+” programme. (FB, 13 July 2016)
Another example is play on full forms and acronyms of the names
of parties, especially those whose policies Kukiz disagrees with. The new
names formed in this way are not only ambiguous but also evaluative, e.g.:
POPiS (from PO ‘Civic Platform’ and PiS ‘Law and Justice) also means
‘a show, display’),34 Platformiarze ‘Platformers’,35 or the ironic Platforma
Oburzonych ‘the Platform of the Outraged’ (PO, ‘Civic Platform’). In another
example, the politician transforms a conventionalised proper name through
an intentional axiological shift:
It is necessary to change the rules for the Constitutional Tribunal [Trybunał Kon-
stytucyjny ] because, so far, it has often been at the beck and call [dyspozycyjny
‘subservient’] of those in power. (Sejm)
By using such ironic devices, the politician consolidates his powerful
position manifested through his acts of violation of moral and linguistic
norms.
The final aspect of Paweł Kukiz’s public statements to be considered
is their degree of comprehensibility. The politician’s style in itself does not
allow one to draw any conclusions in this regard; we have therefore resorted
to the Gunning FOG Index, an instrument that measures the level of text
intelligibility without the need to test the receivers’ competence (Broda,
Maziarz, Piekot, and Radziszewski 2010: 26–28).36
Kukiz’s parliamentary speeches, tested with Gunning’s index, had a FOG
score of 7.60: they should be comprehensible to anyone with eight years of
formal education, i.e., in the Polish context, to graduates of the 8-grade
primary school. For the Facebook posts, a mean FOG score for 30 longer posts
from the period covered by the study was 7.79 (the minimum score was 4.04;
the highest score, of 12.48, was obtained for a post that contained quotes,
34 POPiS is not a very recent creation and cannot be attributed to Kukiz. [editor’s
note]
35 This brings associations, for example, with the negatively evaluated and derogatory
zadymiarze ‘troublemakers’. [editor’s note]
36 A FOG test adapted to Polish texts is available at www.fog.uni.wroc.pl. The index
determines the degree of a text’s difficulty by estimating the duration of formal education
required of the reader to understand it on first reading. The Gunning FOG Index is
calculated using an algorithm that takes into account the number of words in the text,
the length of sentences (the number of words in a sentence), and the number of words
with one, two, and more syllables. The formula, developed by Robert Gunning, converts
these data into the number of years of education necessary for the reader to understand
that text.
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sentences in parentheses, and neologisms composed of three lexemes37).
These results demonstrate that Kukiz’s speeches and comments are also
addressed to young people, secondary school students, whose education
involves civic matters and conscious use of full civic rights.
4. Conclusion
The discussion above shows that Paweł Kukiz’s public linguistic perfor-
mance has a clear populist style. Firstly, its populist aspect is manifest in its
content, making use of all the features constitutive of populism: the central
position of the people in the speaker’s worldview (always in opposition to
elites or “strangers”), the simplification of the linguistic worldview (including
values inherent therein), the figure of a leader representing “the people”.
The style of Kukiz’s speeches and internet posts is far from accidental. The
politician’s style is colloquial, typical of an average speaker of Polish. The
performances are emotionally loaded and evaluative, both aspects being
reinforced through the use of stereotypes and metaphors. Fashioned in this
manner, the style in which Kukiz communicates with his audience is con-
sistent with the image of himself: as both a warrior and a “regular guy”
(albeit one that always enjoys a dominant position). The statements seem
to have been premeditated and the author is certainly aware of the wide
variety of receptive capacities of his Facebook followers. He distinguishes two
categories of receivers, the better and not-so-well prepared to understand
his message: “I will explain what the basic systemic changes would involve,
in writing for the Eagles, and in pictorial form for the Fledglings” (FB, 15
Sep 2015).
The populist dimension of Paweł Kukiz’s Sejm speeches and online com-
mentaries explains why the politician is popular and why he was successful
in the 2015 parliamentary elections. The elements that directly point to the
populist character of his statements, including their idiosyncratic features,
can serve as a basis for comparisons with the discourse of other Polish
politicians. It appears that the various shades of populist political discourse
in contemporary Poland can only be properly characterised if due attention
is paid to Paweł Kukiz’s parlance.
Translated by Klaudia Wengorek-Dolecka
37 Longer posts often contain an abridgement of the content on a banner in the form
of a one- or two-sentence caption explaining the message in the post, usually a topic for
discussion or a demand made by the author and his political circles.
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